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ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AS A PROXY FOR 
FEDERALISM: INTUITION AND REASON 
IN UNITED STATES V. MORRISON 
Allan Ides* 
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VA WA) cre-
ated a private right of action pursuant to the Commerce Clause 
and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment for victims of gender-
based violence. Christy Brzonkala, a young woman who credi-
bly charged that two members of her university's football team 
had raped her, brought suit against her assailants under VA W A 
after the university failed to provide her with redress. In United 
States v. Morrison,1 the Supreme Court held that Congress 
lacked the power to create the civil remedy on which Ms. Brzon-
kala relied. The Court's Commerce Clause discussion empha-
sized the "non-economic" character of gender-based violence. 
In so doing, the Court ostensibly affirmed the constitutional sig-
nificance of this factor in the context of the "substantially af-
fects" test. 
This essay examines the so-called "economic activity" ele-
ment with an eye toward discovering its content and justification. 
In fact, as I will attempt to demonstrate below, this new doc-
trinal twist appears to have no independent content. It operates 
less as an explanation for the result than as a sleight of hand that 
distracts us from the core principle of the decision. The policy 
behind the emerging doctrine, therefore, is starkly instrumental, 
and premised more on ideology than it is on any explication of 
doctrine or reason. 
When Captain Renault shut down Rick's Cafe Americain in 
the film "Casablanca," he announced, "I am shocked, shocked to 
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and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. My thanks to Denis 
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find that gamblin~ is going on in here" -and then quickly pock-
eted his winnings. Our shock in learning that something other 
than pure doctrine may have driven the decision in Morrison is 
similarly ironic. Ideology is, was, and always has been a part of 
the judicial process, and particularly so in the context of consti-
tutional law. But even if we accept this reality, it does not follow 
that the judicial creation of constitutional law should be 
bounded by nothing other than the personal predilections of a 
majority of five. The fact that ideology is something doesn't 
mean it should be everything. 
Ideally, a Supreme Court decision ought to reflect a careful 
accommodation of intuitive judgment and reasoned explanation. 
By "intuitive judgment" I mean the felt sense derived from per-
sonal and professional experience that the principle and its ap-
plication are correct. If we must put a harder spin on the con-
cept, we could call it passion, bias, or ideology. It certainly 
comes in all those flavors. What I am describing is a Justice's 
philosophic sense of right and wrong. I accept this not only as a 
harsh reality, but as a positive good. So, yes, ideology is a critical 
ingredient in the mix. But there must be a mix, and part of that 
mix is the check provided by some form of reasoned explana-
tion. This connotes a relatively dispassionate examination of the 
intuition, an examination that transcends the intuition and tests 
it against a larger legal and societal framework. It requires the 
frank imposition of self-doubt on the initial judgment, a type of 
reality-check. Interwoven with these two elements is the appli-
cation of doctrine, which at its best is a product of collective ex-
perience and applied reason. In a colloquial sense, we would 
like to say that the judgment in any particular case "feels right," 
as being within a reasonable range of options, and that the opin-
ion in support of it has a well-reasoned, independent validity. 
We would also like to see some consistency between that opin-
ion and the prior doctrine, unless a convincing reason is given for 
the departure from previously established norms.3 
Admittedly, the line between intuition and reason is indis-
tinct. Both ways of thinking form and inform one another, and 
either can easily operate as a mask for the other. It is also 
probably true that the power of intuition and ideology can over-
whelm the check of reason, especially in the most highly charged 
2. Casablanca (Warner Bros., 1942). 
3. Of course, doctrine can be used to obfuscate and to bludgeon. It can calcify. I 
am using the term, however, in an ideal sense as the collective experience of a forward-
looking reasoned judgment. 
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and politically heated cases.4 So, yes, the real world is not the 
ideal world, and our own judgment of these matters is always to 
some extent clouded. What should be clear, however, is that nei-
ther intuition nor reason, in isolation, will do. An insistence on 
pure logic both underestimates the critical role that nonlinear 
thinking plays in all human decision making and denies the real 
world implications of a decision.5 This may be one of the rea-
sons why strict originalism has never gained much of a foothold 
in the Court. It lacks the basic flesh of human experience. On 
the other hand, exclusive reliance on intuition simply transforms 
personal predilection into the law, and this is hardly a recipe for 
either justice or coherence. What we seek is not perfection, but 
a balance between the subjective and objective elements of deci-
sion. 
Perhaps this middle ground between law as pure reason and 
law as personal preference does not exist. One's intuition, emo-
tion, or ideology may inevitably control the ultimate conclusion 
reached. However, even if this observation is correct, the appli-
cation of reason can provide "non-believers" a sufficient basis 
for accepting the legitimacy of a judgment with which they dis-
agree. In essence, the reasoning process creates a shared lexicon 
that is capable of embracing and validating discordant views, and 
as such it creates a realm within which passionate minds can dif-
fer and in which a range of passionate but reasonable alterna-
tives may peacefully coexist. 
To return to the subject at hand, the immediate question is 
whether the decision in Morrison, and in particular the "eco-
nomic activity" portion of that opinion, satisfies the above crite-
ria. As I have suggested, I believe that it does not. 
* * * 
The Morrison Court's discussion of the Commerce Clause 
opens with a standard and relatively non-controversial descrip-
tion of the scope of the commerce power. Congress may regu-
late the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 
i.e., anything that either is interstate commerce or anything that 
is in interstate commerce, as well as certain matters that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce. Since VA W A provided a rem-
edy for conduct that was concededly not itself interstate com-
4. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). I'm sure there's a 
more recent example, but the name escapes me at the moment. 
5. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error (Putnam, 1994); John Dewey, Logical 
Method and Law,lO Cornell L.Q. 17 (1924). 
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merce nor necessarily in interstate commerce, the statute had to 
rest on the "substantially affects" principle. More specifically, 
the question was whether gender-based violence substantially 
affected interstate commerce. Congress said it did. The Court 
said it did not. 
In so ruling, the Court relied in part on the non-economic 
nature of gender-based violence. This should not have surprised 
anyone who had read United States v. Lopez.6 In striking down 
the Gun Free School Zones Act, the Lopez Court emphasized 
what it perceived as the non-economic nature of the regulated 
activity, namely, the possession of a gun in a school zone.7 
Whether this non-economic status completely insulated the ac-
tivity from congressional oversight under the commerce power 
was left ambiguous. Clearly, however, the non-economic charac-
terization played a significant role in the Court's determination 
that a substantial relationship with interstate commerce was 
lacking. 
In Morrison, the Court reiterated the significance of this 
new threshold consideration, noting that "a fair reading of Lo-
pez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct 
at issue was central to our decision in that case. "8 Applying this 
principle, the Court then concluded without elaboration Gust as 
it had done with gun possession) that "[g]ender-motivated 
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic 
activity."9 Again, as in Lopez, the Court was coy with respect to 
the dispositive nature of this factor. "While we need not adopt a 
categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any non-
economic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our 
Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regu-
lation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic 
in nature." 10 In other words, this factor is "central" but not nec-
essarily dispositive, leaving the Court some doctrinal wiggle 
room while creating a relatively effective barrier to congres-
sional regulation. 
From a purely doctrinal perspective, the Court's reliance on 
"economic activity" as a factor limiting the scope of congres-
6. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
7. Id. at561,567. 
8. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. 
9. Id. at 613 (emphasis added); cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("The possession of a 
gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repeti-
tion elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.") 
10. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
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sional power raises two legitimate questions. First, what does 
the Court mean by the phrase, "economic activity?" Next, why 
does the economic character of an activity matter if the question 
is one of substantial effects on interstate commerce? We will 
consider each question in turn. The answers may illuminate the 
intuitive judgment at the heart of Morrison and the Court's ef-
fort to rationalize the result. 
ON DEFINING ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
As to the first question, the Court did not define economic 
activity in either Lopez or Morrison. Rather, the Court's con-
clusions regarding gun possession and gender-based violence 
rest on the judicial sense that there is really nothing to argue 
about regarding what the Court characterized as a pivotal issue. 
In the Court's view, no matter how broadly one defines "eco-
nomic activity," neither gun possession in a school zone nor gen-
der-based violence could possibly qualify.ll This assumption, 
while clearly convenient and perhaps even appealing as a rhe-
torical device, is a bit of an overstatement. In what follows, I 
consider a variety definitions of "economic activity," to see 
which, if any, make doctrinal sense in the context of the Morri-
son Court's holding. 
In his leading treatise on law and economics, Judge Richard 
A. Posner proposes the following definition of economics: 
"[E)conomics is the science of rational choice in a world-our 
world-in which resources are limited in relation to human 
wants." 12 Within this real world, individuals operate as rational 
maximizers of their own self-interest. Their activity in this re-
gard is quintessentially economic. And while economic theory 
often favors voluntary transfers and market transactions, forced 
transfers are nonetheless economic in nature as well. In both 
contexts, voluntary and involuntary, the exchange of wealth or 
utility is an economic event. Moreover, the economic market is 
not limited to the realm of pecuniary exchange. Economics is 
"about resource use, money being merely a claim on re-
sources.... [Thus] housework is an economic activity, even if 
the houseworker is a spouse who does not receive pecuniary 
compensation; it involves cost-primarily the opportunity cost of 
the houseworker's time." 13 
II. Id. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
12. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 3 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1992). 
13. ld. at 7. 
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With this definition in mind, let's consider the economic na-
ture of gender-based violence, and of rape in particular. Simply 
and starkly put, the perpetrator of the violence maximizes his 
self-interest at the expense of the victim. In the specific context 
of rape, the rapist, acting within a market in which sex is not a 
free commodity,14 perceives the benefits of forced sexual inter-
course as outweighing the risk of prosecution and punishment. 
He forcibly takes that to which he has no right. The conse-
quence of this choice, generated in part by the perceived low 
cost of the crime, is a forced transfer of wealth and utility from 
the victim to the rapist, with attendant costs to both the victim 
and society. The victim is stripped of her free choice, her bodily 
integrity, and her confidence that she alone controls her sexual 
freedom. A society that recognizes the egregious nature of this 
crime might feel morally obligated to reallocate its economic re-
sources toward prevention and recompense. 
Characterizing gender-based violence as economic does not 
belittle or diminish the problem of gender-based violence or 
sanitize the horrific nature of rape. Clearly, the personal tragedy 
of rape can outrun the economic consequences of this particu-
larly loathsome crime. But an examination of those economic 
consequences exposes rape for what it is- a brutal theft and in-
vasion of the most basic economic interest one can have, namely, 
dominion over one's own body. In a sense, the rapist claims an 
ownership interest in the victim in much the same way as a mas-
ter claims an ownership interest in a slave. Not too surprisingly, 
rape was a brutal by-product of the master/slave relationship in 
antebellum South. The analogy goes further. The critical differ-
ence between slavery and freedom is the free person's right to 
contract, which includes the right to determine the circumstances 
under which others may exploit one's body. Rape involves a 
forced relinquishment of that fundamental, personal, and eco-
nomic right. 
Nor is this characterization of gender-based violence par-
ticularly novel. The right of a person to be free from violence of 
whatever kind has been long recognized as basic component of 
Anglo-American tort law. The traditional remedy for such harm 
is the award of compensatory damages, i.e., an economic meas-
14. As to the economic market and sex, Posner observes, "Sex is an economic activ-
ity too. The search for a sexual partner (as well as the sex act itself} takes time and thus 
imposes a cost measured by the value of that time in its next-best use .. The risk of dis~ase 
or of unwanted pregnancy is also a cost of sex-a real, though not pnmanly a pecuruary, 
cost." Id. at 7. 
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ure of the harm done to the victim. 15 If the harm itself is not at 
least in part economic, it's difficult to see how the award of dam-
ages can be seen as redressing the injury. In any event, it would 
seem that Congress was acting on precisely this principle when it 
created the private right of action under VA W A. Provision of 
that private right recognizes that the economic loss generated by 
gender-based violence, i.e., the forced wealth transfer, entitles 
the victim to an economic compensatory remedy. Moreover, the 
availability of damages also imposes a higher price on acts of 
gender-based violence, creating a greater (or at least additional) 
disincentive for their commission. The creation of this disincen-
tive is itself an economic act on the part of society. So what may 
seem intuitively odd is a commonplace of our economic and le-
gal system. Rape, regardless of how else one might characterize 
it, is also an economic crime. And a civil remedy for rape is part 
of that economic equation. 16 
Judge Posner would seem to be in accord. He defines 
crime, including violent crime, as representing an economic 
transaction in which there is a "coercive transfer either of wealth 
or utility from victim to wrongdoer. "17 He then specifically de-
scribes rape as a crime that "bypasses the market in sexual rela-
tions (marital and otherwise) in the same way that theft bypasses 
markets in ordinary goods and services, and therefore should be 
forbidden." 18 In short, rape is an economic crime, and the act of 
rape constitutes economic activity. 
The activity regulated in Lopez would also seem to have 
been economic in nature. It should not require a string of cita-
tions or an arcane philosophical discourse to defend the position 
that the exercise of dominion over personal property constitutes 
an economic act. 19 For example, by constructing a wall around 
that which I claim to be my property, I engage in an economic 
act by attempting to maximize my utility in that property vis a vis 
the general public. Lopez was exercising and asserting precisely 
such a property interest in the gun he brought to school. He 
possessed and asserted dominion over it. Indeed, he brought it 
to school to sell it, a fact the Lopez Court conveniently ignored. 
15. Id. at 191 ("The Function of Tort Damages"). 
16. Of course, not failing to provide an effective remedy for rape is also an eco-
nomic act since the need to prevent the activity then remains with the potential victims 
who can either purchase protection or engage in self-help. 
17. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 217 (cited in note 12). 
18. Id. at 218. 
19. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (recognizing as a property right the 
possessory interest in a chattel purchased on credit). 
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So not only was Lopez an economic actor asserting a property 
right in a piece of personal property, he was an economic actor 
on a commercial mission. Seen in this light, the statute in Lopez, 
at least as applied, should have cleared the "economic activity" 
hurdle under the Court's seemingly open-ended definition of this 
element. 
In short, the Court's confident assertion that a criminal stat-
ute regulating gun possession has nothing to do with an "eco-
nomic enterprise" would seem to be somewhat off target. 
Of course, just as the Constitution does not embrace Mr. 
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, it need not embrace Judge Pos-
ner's view of economics. But if the concept of economic activity 
is "central" to the scope of congressional power, as the Court 
tells us it is, the Constitution must embrace some view of its 
meaning. Given the Court's lack of guidance, we can only 
speculate. Perhaps the Court meant to limit its definition of 
economic activity to commercial activity. In Lopez, for example, 
the Court at times used the words economic and commercial in-
terchangeably.20 Yet in key passages in both cases the majority 
opinions relied almost exclusively on the broader phrase, "eco-
nomic activity," inviting the reader to apply the most liberal 
definition to it. Having taken that invitation, we can see that the 
"obvious conclusion" is not necessarily the one the Court pro-
posed. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AS COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY 
Suppose, however, that the Court did mean to limit the 
more inclusive phrase to one of its specific iterations, namely, 
commercial activity. The Court has again left us to discover our 
own definition of this "central" consideration. Presumably such 
a definition would include the exchange of goods or services for 
profit-the definition of "commerce" used by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in Gibbons v. Ogden.21 It might also include the creation of 
goods or services for the marketplace, e.g., production, manufac-
turing, farming, etc., and all other activities designed to facilitate 
transactions within that marketplace, e.g., systems of credit, in-
surance, advertising, etc. After all, such activities are commonly 
understood to be commercial in nature. The definition could 
20. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66; see also id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Con-
gress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single 
market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy."). 
21. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
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also embrace the post-exchange use of a product on the fair as-
sumption that utility is part of the bargained-for exchange, 
covering such matters as consumer and environmental safety and 
the like. In other words, commercial activity could be defined to 
embrace a broadly construed range of activities designed to 
promote pecuniary gain. The possession of a gun in a school 
zone would seem to fit this definition. As Justice Stevens in his 
Lopez dissent observed, "Guns are both articles of commerce 
and articles that can be used to restrain commerce. Their pos-
session is the consequence, either directly or indirectly, of com-
mercial activity. "22 
Of course, we could continue to narrow the definition of 
commercial activity until the facts of Lopez are plainly excluded 
from its terms. Given the Court's treatment of gun possession in 
Lopez as "non-commercial," one must assume that that is what 
the Court did or would have done if it had actually thought 
about the definitional problem. But we are left to wonder what 
that narrower definition might be and why is it to be preferred 
over other more inclusive and generally accepted alternatives. 
Again we can speculate. For example, commercial activity could 
be limited to the mere exchange of goods and services, essen-
tially cutting off the head and tail of the overall commercial 
process. This would make the crime in Lopez "non-commercial" 
(and therefore non-economic) in the sense that simple posses-
sion of a weapon is not an exchange. It may be the product of an 
exchange or the precursor to an exchange, but it is not itself an 
exchange. Yet the Court, at least since United States v. Darby,23 
has not taken such a restrictive view. And both the Lopez and 
Morrison Courts went out of their way to reaffirm the post-New 
Deal precedents applying the substantial effects test to elements 
of the commercial process not directly involved in the actual ex-
change of goods, e.g., production, farming, mining, etc. So this 
very narrow definition would seem to be an unsatisfactory can-
didate. 
Another alternative for the Court would have been to de-
fine commercial activity as including the entire commercial 
process up through the exchange of the good or service. Post-
exchange possession, therefore, would be excluded, the idea be-
ing that the stream of commerce has come to an end. Gun pos-
session is again outside the scope of the definition. Yet this "end 
22. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602-03. 
23. U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
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of commerce" definition is somewhat artificial and is reminiscent 
of the Court's long discarded and overly formalistic "original 
package" and "come to rest" doctrines.24 It presumably includes 
the exchanged service since commerce cannot end until the ser-
vice is complete, but not the use or performance of an exchanged 
product. It also assumes that the "stream of commerce" actually 
ends with the commercial exchange. In the context of guns, for 
example, post-exchange possession is usually but a temporary 
detour from a continuing process of use and exchange. This 
view also runs counter to the Court's consistently held position 
that garbage-a post-exchange good if ever there was one-is a 
legitimate article of commerce, the regulation of which is subject 
to the restrictions of the Commerce Clause.Z5 With that in mind, 
it would appear that Mr. Lopez could be prohibited from buying 
the gun, from selling it, and from throwing it away. He couldn't, 
however, be prohibited from possessing it in the interim between 
purchase and sale or discard. Here doctrine can be said to reach 
terminal sterility. 
The "end of commerce" definition also leads to some inter-
esting anomalies. If possession is not considered "commercial" 
for purposes of the commerce power, then we will have to jump 
through some interesting hoops to explain how the federal gov-
ernment can regulate the mere possession of a controlled sub-
stance. Presumably the Court would assert that the ban on pos-
session although not itself economic was part of the regulation of 
economic activity, namely, the sale of controlled substances.Z6 
One would at least hope for some significant findings by Con-
gress in this regard, findings that demonstrate, for example, that 
marijuana grown for personal use actually has a discernable im-
pact on the illegal drug trade.27 Yet one must admit that even in 
the absence of such findings the necessary doctrinal stretch 
would not be beyond the capacity of a Court on a mission. 
24. See, e.g., In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Michelin Tire 
Corp. v. Wages,423 U.S. 276 (1976). 
25. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); 
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary 
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
26. Sec Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561: "[The Gun Free School Zones Act] is not an essen-
tial part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could 
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." 
27. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (consumption of wheat grown 
on farm constitutes 20% of the yearly production of wheat thus establishing a substantial 
effect on the interstate wheat market). 
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That brings us back to Morrison. Let's suppose that we 
adopt either the "exchange of goods or services" or the "end of 
commerce" definitions of commercial activity. How would gen-
der-based violence fare within these definitions? To answer this 
we need to consider the commercial nature of crimes. The Lo-
pez Court specifically recognized that extortionate credit trans-
actions, i.e., credit transactions enforced by the use or threat vio-
lence or other criminal means, fell within the realm of economic 
(or commercial) activity.28 Importantly, the crime in Perez was 
not the making of the loan or its terms, but the potentially vio-
lent nature of the collection technique, which included paybacks 
that far exceeded the obligations made under the loan. Quite 
clearly the victims of loan sharking had not consented to either 
of these practices. In other words, what was being regulated was 
a forced exchange of money. Thus our definition of commercial 
activity as an exchange of goods, with Perez as a guide, might 
well include such property crimes as larceny, robbery, and bur-
glary, all of which involve the forced exchange of goods. Having 
gone this far it is but a small step (if it is a step at all) to conclude 
that the forced exchange of services is also commercial in nature. 
Clearly Morrison does not involve a commercial exchange 
of goods, criminal or otherwise. The transaction in Morrison 
does, however, involve a forced exchange of sexual services and 
in this sense is as commercial as the threat to use violence to col-
lect a debt in Perez. Again, the definition of commercial activity 
could be narrowed in a manner that excludes the facts of Morri-
son while at the same time affirming the Lopez Court's charac-
terization of the crime in Perez as economic. For example, we 
could say that it was the antecedent credit transaction in Perez 
that "commercialized" the criminal acts of extortion. The Court 
in Perez, however, imposed no such limitation, suggesting in-
stead that the nature of the extortionate criminal transaction, 
commercial or otherwise, was completely irrelevant to the scope 
of the commerce power.29 But pruning doctrine is part of the ju-
dicial process and the current Court could certainly reinterpret 
Perez to cover a very specific type of "commercial" crime. 
Where does this leave us? The Court in Lopez and Morri-
son insisted that the economic nature of an activity was central 
in determining whether Congress could regulate that activity. In 
28. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 (1971). 
29. Morrison, 402 U.S. at 151-52 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 
(1942)). 
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neither case, however, did the Court provide even a working 
definition of economic (or commercial) activity. Rather, the 
standard, if there is one at all, appears to be something along the 
lines of "I know it when I see it." We can say with some confi-
dence that this standard is significantly narrower than the Pos-
nerian view of economics. It is also less inclusive than a variety 
of plausible definitions of commercial activity, including defini-
tions that seem to be implicit in some of the Court's own deci-
sions. So why did the Court pick a seemingly restrictive ad hoc 
standard over the other available alternatives? Does that stan-
dard reflect more accurately the everyday reality of economic 
and commercial practices? Does it measure more precisely the 
economic consequences of the regulated activity? Does it assess 
more effectively the impact that activity may have on interstate 
commerce? 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to answer these questions 
given the Court's cryptic treatment of this issue. Perhaps the an-
swers can be found in an examination of the second question 
posed above: why does the economic character of an activity 
matter in determining if it has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce? For if we know why the economic character mat-
ters, we might glean some insight into what is or should be 
meant by the phrase "economic activity." 
ON THE RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
One reason that the economic character of an activity might 
matter would stem from a legitimate desire to understand the 
real world consequences of that activity. In other words, appli-
cation of some form of economic theory might be useful in ex-
posing the actual costs, in terms of human capital, of either regu-
lating or not regulating the activity. For example, an economic 
analysis of rape exposes the damage, both personal and social, 
caused by the crime. With this awareness we can more fully ap-
preciate the relationship between rape and arguably pertinent 
national interests such as interstate commerce. Or if the eco-
nomic consequences of a particular activity are exposed as triv-
ial, we might be more reluctant to find the necessary connection 
with interstate commerce. Simple possession of marijuana might 
be a case in point. 
Such a realistic approach does not, however, seem to have 
been at the heart of what the Court was doing in either Lopez or 
Morrison. In neither opinion did the Court explore the potential 
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economic nature or economic consequences of the regulated 
transaction. Rather the economic activity element, which was 
applied in a conclusory fashion, seems to have been premised on 
an a priori view of the inherent limits of congressional power. 
Realism aside, we might find the seeds of the economic ac-
tivity element in the Constitution itself. The authority granted 
to Congress by Article I, § 8, cl. 3, is the power to "regulate 
Commerce ... among the several States." If "commerce" is the 
matter to be regulated then it would seem that the scope of the 
power should be limited to interstate commercial matters. That 
is, after all, what the Constitution says.30 Yet even from a textu-
alist perspective, the Constitution says much more than this. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause provides a sweep to the exer-
cise of congressional power that is not bound by the precise text 
of the enumerated powers.31 More to the point, nothing in the 
language of the Necessary and Proper Clause limits its scope in 
the context of the commerce power to the regulation of distinctly 
commercial matters. The clause certainly doesn't say that, and 
judicial constructions of it, beginning with McCulloch v. Mary-
land,32 seem to grant Congress at least some latitude in deter-
mining which means are appropriate to the exercise of an enu-
merated power. The war powers, for example, may be exercised 
over matters that are not technically during a war or not even 
within a broadly conceived theater of war, in fact, to matters that 
would not normally be considered "military. "33 
If, despite the foregoing observations, we adopt a formal 
definition of the commerce power that limits the scope of the 
power to commercial matters, we are confronted with another 
problem. Highly formalistic approaches to constitutional law are 
bound to fail in all but the most obvious circumstances. They 
are premised on the notion that the scope of a granted power or 
the range of an individual right can be permanently cabined by a 
technical doctrinal device. This presumes a form of constitu-
tional practice over time that simply does not exist. Even if we 
could momentarily agree on the structure of such formalism, the 
force of current conditions as reflected in actual cases subverts 
30. Grant S. Nelson and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: 
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State 
Control over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1999). 
31. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, d. 17. 
32. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
33. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller, Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948) (post-war rent controls); 
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919) (upholding War-Time Prohibi-
tion Act). 
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such princirles and eventually adjusts them to the felt necessities 
of society.3 Even within relatively limited periods of time, for-
mal principles tend to obscure or morph when applied through 
the vehicle of doctrine to real situations. For example, Justice 
Black's insistence on the sanctity of the text in the context of the 
First Amendment-no law means no law-dissolved when he 
was confronted with intuitively uncomfortable forms of commu-
nication.35 
Thus, we need to consider the extent to which the economic 
activity element rests on sound and enduring principles of consti-
tutional law. Since the economic activity element operates 
within the judicially-created substantially affects test-a test that 
both Lopez and Morrison reaffirmed, the first step is to deter-
mine the constitutional foundations for that doctrine. In United 
States v. Darby, 36 the Court used this test to validate an exercise 
of congressional power directed at intrastate activities, i.e., to 
matters not within the technical or literal scope of the Com-
merce Clause. "The power of Congress over interstate com-
merce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the 
states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect in-
terstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over 
it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the at-
tainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power 
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. "37 Whether this 
conclusion is based specifically on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause or on inferences drawn from constitutional structure, its 
import for our purposes remains the same. The powers of the 
national government embrace activities falling outside of the 
sphere of granted authority so long as these "outside activities" 
affect matters falling within the sphere. Plainly, it is not the na-
ture of the outside activities that counts. It's their effect on the 
constitutionally regulable activities that matters. After all, the 
structural extension of power is meant to allow Congress to con-
trol the effects, not the outside activities. The regulation of 
those outside activities is simply an incident to the authority to 
control the effects. 
34. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 1 (Little, Brown, 1881). 
35. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (declining to see the free 
speech implications of a public protest); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971} Uoin-
ing Justice Blackmun's dissent treating jacket emblazoned with "Fuck the Draft" as 
largely conduct and not speech}. 
36. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
37. Id. at 119 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
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That brings us back to the Lopez/Morrison Court's treat-
ment of "economic activity" as a "central" element of the sub-
stantially affects test. Since the constitutional foundation for this 
test is the impact on interstate commerce caused by the outside 
activity, one can fairly ask, what is it about the economic or 
commercial character of an activity that inherently alters the de-
gree or substantiality of the impact? The answer is nothing 
whatsoever. While perhaps economic or commercial activity 
may more often have a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
than non-economic activity, that plausibility does not increase or 
decrease the actual effect in particular cases. As the Court has 
whimsically observed, "If it is interstate commerce that feels the 
pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies 
the squeeze."38 And, one might add, a squeeze is a squeeze 
whether it be economic, commercial, or otherwise. Justice 
Breyer makes a similar point in his Morrison dissent: 
More important, why should we give critical constitutional 
importance to the economic, or noneconomic, nature of an in-
terstate-commerce-affecting cause? If chemical emanations 
through indirect environmental change cause identical, severe 
commercial harm outside a State, why should it matter 
whether local factories or home fireplaces release them? The 
Constitution itself refers only to Congress' power to 'regulate 
Commerce ... among the several States,' and to make laws 
'necessary and proper' to implement that power. Art. I, § 8, 
cis. 3, 18. The language says nothing about either the local na-
ture, or the economic nature, of an interstate-commerce-
ff . 39 a ectmg cause. 
Given the foregoing, it appears that the Lopez/Morrison 
Court altered the substantially affects doctrine with little regard 
for the rationale behind it. Of course, the Court is always free to 
change or jettison doctrine, but one hopes that any such action 
will have some comprehensible rationale. The Morrison Court's 
primary explanation for inclusion of the economic activity ele-
ment is that "thus far in our Nation's history our cases have up-
held Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only 
where that activity is economic in nature."40 To the Court, 
therefore, these new statutes seemed unconstitutional because 
they were unfamiliar. This, of course, confuses the familiar with 
the constitutional, and to rest a judgment on the lack of familiar-
38. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460,464 (1949). 
39. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
40. !d. at 613. 
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ity alone is to base that judgment solely on a reactionary intui-
tion, i.e., one premised solely on the past, without the necessary 
check of reasoned judgment applied in the context of the pre-
sent. In any event, this alteration of doctrine provides no clue as 
to how we might define economic activity. 
AN INSTRUMENTAL DEFINITION OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 
The statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison did take federal 
regulation into at least somewhat novel territory. By regulating 
gun possession in a school zone and gender-based violence in 
general, Congress entered realms of lawmaking that previously 
had been largely left to the states. In the Court's view these ex-
ercises of congressional power threatened the basic structure of 
our federal system by allowing Congress to supplant traditional 
state prerogatives. As the Morrison Court observed, "if Con-
gress may regulate gender-motivated violence, it would be able 
to regulate murder or any other type of violence since gen-
der-motivated violence, as a subset of all violent crime, is certain 
to have lesser economic impacts than the larger class of which it 
is a part."41 Similarly, in Lopez the Court strongly suggested 
that the field of primary and secondary education was a matter 
largely beyond the reach of the commerce power.42 In general, 
permitting Congress such legislative latitude would invite con-
gressional intervention into other "areas of traditional state 
regulation" such as marriage, divorce, and childrearing.43 "We 
accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that con-
duct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution 
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is 
truly local."44 Stated somewhat differently, the enumeration of 
powers presupposes something not enumerated, and that some-
thing is the authority to regulate matters deemed truly local.45 
The problem the Court perceived in Lopez and Morrison, 
therefore, was not that Congress was attempting to regulate non-
economic matters, or that the activity's aggregate effects on in-
41. Id. at 615. 
42. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565. 
43. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 
44. Id. at 617-18. (emphasis added) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (citing NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937))). 
45. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. 
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terstate commerce were too tenuous in any quantitative sense. 
In fact, the preceding quote suggests that the degree of impact 
on interstate commerce was irrelevant. Rather the problem was 
that Congress was attempting to regulate matters that in the 
Court's view were traditionally and perhaps exclusively left to 
the states. All this talk about economic or commercial activity 
(or any of the other doctrinal elements mentioned in these two 
opinions) was simply a proxy for this much more significant 
theme. Thus any effort to define "economic activity" solely by 
reference to economic theory or to factors measuring the com-
mercia! nature of the activity is a fool's errand. The definition 
must also account for the critical distinction between what is 
"truly national and what is truly local." Gender-based violence 
and gun possession are non-economic because they involve mat-
ters that are "truly local." Similarly, they do not substantially af-
fect interstate commerce for the simple reason that Congress has 
no authority to regulate them. These may sound like nonsequit-
ers, but in the world of free-floating doctrine they represent the 
essence of pure reason. 
That the Court's economic activity element has little to do 
with economics or commercial behavior is evident from the 
other areas the Court identified as beyond the regulatory reach 
of Congress. In Lopez, the Court expressed concern that valida-
tion of the Gun Free School Zones Act would lead to the federal 
regulation of the details of elementary and secondary education, 
including such matters as curriculum.46 Yet the provision of 
education, both public and private, is plainly economic, even 
commercial. It involves the exchange of a service for valuable 
consideration.47 Teachers, after all, are paid for what they do. 
The Republican Party seems to understand this simple fact. The 
avowed idea behind that party's support for vouchers is that pri-
vate schools can provide a better service than is now provided by 
some public schools. Just follow the money. If, from a constitu-
tional perspective, the provision of education is not economic, it 
is only because it involves a matter that in the Court's estimation 
is "truly local." 
Similarly, the Morrison Court expressed concern that the 
constitutional theory behind VA W A would .germit Congress to 
regulate marriage, divorce, and childrearing. Yet marriage in-
46. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 . 
. 47. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (citing state funding of edu-
catiOnal mstitutwns as an example of the market participant doctrine). 
48. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16. 
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volves a classic contractual relationship with obvious economic 
dimensions, and divorce is the means through which that con-
tract is dissolved. Indeed, the terms of a divorce are typically 
measured by the pecuniary obligations of one spouse to the 
other. The advent of "pre-nuptials" makes the economic charac-
ter of the relationship crystal clear. Such agreements are de-
signed to control the economic consequences of the marriage 
contract. And what about childrearing? Only a person who has 
never raised a child would consider this activity to be purely 
non-economic. Among other things, the law imposes clear fi-
nancial obligations on the parents. Why, therefore, would we 
describe marriage, divorce, or childrearing as non-economic? 
Again, like education, they involve matters that the Court deems 
truly local. 
In short, the definition of economic activity would seem to 
include any activity pertaining to the exchange of goods or ser-
vices which does not involve a matter of local concern. 
INTUITION, REASON, AND DOCTRINE 
The basic intuition behind Morrison is that the civil remedy 
created by VAWA transgressed the undefined distinction be-
tween what is truly local and what is truly national. That intui-
tion can be seen as deriving from a sense of the reserved powers 
of the states-reflecting the Court's solicitude for states rights-
or as based on the platitude that the enumeration of powers pre-
supposes something not enumerated-reflecting a judicial an-
tipathy for congressional excess. Or a little of both. My point 
here is not to criticize these intuitions, but to note that neither 
have anything to do with the economic character of the regu-
lated activity. Or to put itn differently, the economic activity 
element does not in any manner justify these intuitions about the 
scope of national power. 
The economic activity factor has only the most tangential 
relationship to the Court's intuitions, and then only if we define 
the phrase in terms of the distinction between what is truly na-
tional and what is truly local, essentially milking it of independ-
ent meaning. In this sense, the application of doctrine does not 
operate as a reasoned measure of the Court's judgment, but as a 
rather thin and intrinsically unpersuasive cover for it. The ir-
relevancy of this economic activity factor is further indicated by 
the Court's failure to define this "central" term or to provide any 
rationale explaining its constitutional relevance. Rather, from 
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the Court's perspective, it is simply enough to observe that the 
congressional regulation of non-economic activity, whatever that 
phrase may entail, has not been judicially validated in the past. 
This represents a gross evasion of the underlying issues, a type of 
shell game that adds little to constitutional discourse other than 
cynicism. 
My dispute with the Court is not simply stylistic. Nor is it 
premised on a disagreement with the result. Congress does on 
occasion (and perhaps too often) jump on the "feel good" band-
wagon without fully considering constitutional policy and conse-
quences. An occasional knuckle rapping may be in order. But 
given our constitutional system, if that rebuke is to be judicially 
delivered, it ought to represent something more than the iron fist 
of policy disagreement in the velvet glove of doctrinal formalism. 
Once we accept, as I think we must, that constitutional law is not 
a product of pure logic or formalism, but also reflects the intui-
tive judgment of the judicial lawmakers, a frank application of 
doctrine or a clear explication of reasoning becomes critical to 
the legitimacy of the judicial product. 
Virtually all human decisions begin with an intuition or a 
feeling. Those intuitions are largely premised on experience 
(with the exception of the most basic flight-or-fight type of reac-
tions). Our intuitions, however, can be flawed and misleading. 
They can reflect bias and gross prejudice. As a consequence, al-
though we rely on our intuitions, as civilized people we also de-
pend on a process of reasoning to examine those intuitions and, 
when appropriate, to revise them. The "reasons" for acting on 
any particular intuition flow from this consequentialist examina-
tion. Assuming the Justices share these universal human charac-
teristics, it is both wise and fair to expect them to test their con-
stitutional intuitions through reasoned judgment. In the absence 
of such a practice, a judicial decision is simply a product of 
power disguised as law and entitled only to the respect that 
comes with inevitability. 
Returning to Morrison, a reasoned justification that spoke 
in terms of the Court's examined intuitive judgment would look 
quite different from the one we saw in the Court's opinion. 
Among other things, it might consider the scope of the reserved 
powers doctrine, its content, and its present utility. It might also 
explore whether the often stated premise for this new federal-
ism- the protection of liberty- was served or disserved by the 
application of the principle in the context of the Morrison facts. 
It could examine the Court's concern that a broader reading of 
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congressional power would eviscerate the concept of enumer-
ated powers. Baldly stating the platitude does no more than re-
formulate the intuition. It also overlooks the Courts ability to 
enforce the platitude through a standard, rational basis applica-
tion of the substantially affects test. If, in the Court's view, that 
test is itself constitutionally suspect, then the Court should say so 
and explain why.49 
Several other questions come to mind. How, for example, 
does the parallel federal regulation of violent crime impinge on 
the power of the states? Do such parallel measures undermine 
state authority or prevent the states from protecting the health, 
safety, or welfare of their constituents? Do they undermine lib-
erty? What defines the scope of a constitutionally protected 
state prerogative? Does a tradition of state regulation auto-
matically equate with an exclusive constitutional prerogative? 
What qualifies as a tradition? Under what circumstances might 
a tradition of state regulation evolve into a tradition of federal 
regulation? Why is a rational basis application of the substan-
tially affects test inadequate to serve the intuitions underlying 
the Court's judgment? This may be dangerous or uncharted ter-
ritory, but we are entitled to at least a rough map of the terrain if 
these are the true trail markers of the Court's judgment. 
Essentially what we end up with in Morrison is a highly 
formalistic opinion based on vaguely conceived, nonintersecting 
realms of power between the national and state governments. 
This is the same type of formalism that collapsed under the pres-
sure of the Great Depression and will likely be subject to a simi-
lar fate in the future. It represents at best a temporary political 
fix for a problem that is better resolved by reference to the ac-
tual experience of governing. The damage done by the opinion, 
however, arises not out of its formalism, but out of its use of doc-
trine as a cover for an unexamined intuition. Here lie the seeds 
of a cynicism that this Court has unfortunately fostered with de-
cisions like Lopez and Morrison, among others. Each might 
fairly be said to have involved a result in search of a rationale. It 
does not follow that there is no rationale for these decisions. My 
point is simply that any such rationale can not be discerned 
within from the four corners of the opinions. 
49. See id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
